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Abstract
Neoclassical theory erroneously makes the assumption that firms maximise profits on a
fixed endowment of physical capital leading to the pervasive rule of thumb that firms produce
at a level of output where marginal revenues equal marginal costs. However this is merely a
special case of the general goal of firms maximising returns on all costs. Firms adopting a
return-seeking strategy make decisions that are consistent with fundamental assumptions of
financial analysis and outperform profit maximising firms.
Introducing time and a measure of incremental capital unit into the model overcomes many
limitations with mainstream analysis, particularly in relation to capital investment decisions.
This new framework provides a more general model with which to consider market interactions
and allows for observable pricing mechanisms, such as mark-up pricing, downward sloping cost
curves at the firm level, and ignorance of marginal costs by firm managers. It also reveals
that the leap between the positive descriptive model and the normative welfare implications
of markets outcomes cannot be bridged by the fundamental welfare theorems.
JEL Classifications: D01, D21, D40
Keywords: Firm behaviour, pricing, return, profit, capital investment
1 Introduction
The neoclassical model of markets is considered the core theory of the economics discipline. So
revered is the model that its worship is often parodied by insiders (eg. Figure 1). This defining
core supports a discipline tasked with understanding the nature of resource allocation decisions,
particularly through markets, and analyse patterns of growth, trade, and monetary and macro-
economic variables. Few students of economics progress past this model to more advanced models
which can capture more realistic behaviour of markets and most economic analysis of government
policy decisions are fundamentally based on this model.
Despite widespread criticism1 some fundamental problems of the core are routinely overlooked.
1. The market origins of the normal rate of return
2. No scope to understand economic rents (merely the abstract notion of surplus)
3. Firms minimise returns to normal when they maximise profits
4. Economies of scale are typically absent at the optimal output levels
∗Accompanying interactive demonstrations of the new model are available at the research website
http://buddyexperiment.blogspot.com.au/p/return-seeking-firms.html
†University of Queensland, School of Economics
‡Contact email: ckmurray@gmail.com
1For example, Google Scholar produces 54,600 results for the phrase “criticism of neoclassical market theory”
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Figure 1: A parody of the worshipped core models of econ tribes (Leijonhufvud 1973)
5. Competition is merely a static choice of output level (capital investment decisions are ex-
cluded from the model)
6. The normative leap implied by the fundamental welfare theorems usually does not hold
A modification of the firm’s decision problem from maximising profit under conditions of fixed
capital, to one of maximising returns on all costs, enables a new model to emerge that offers
explanations of these identified problems. This modification is compatible with many existing
conceptual structures from neoclassical models, such as the market demand curve, cost curves
under economies and diseconomies of scale, but shows that supply curves are an emergent phe-
nomena. This new market model of return-seeking firms is detailed in Section 3 following a brief
recap of the core market model in Section 2. Some implications for understanding markets, com-
petition, and policy-making are discussed in Section 4, and directions for expansion of this new
framework are identified in the concluding remarks.
2 The neoclassical market model
2.1 Defining features
The reader is assumed to be familiar with the basics of the family of core neoclassical market
models, and only a brief recap of key features is discussed with reference to the market behaviours
they seek to capture.2
Output, q, is a convex function of inputs such as labour and capital, qS = f(L,K), which are
assumed to be substitutes at the margin. Demand is an inverse function of price, qd = f(p),
markets clear, qd = qs, and profits are maximised to ‘normal’ under competitive conditions,
0 = Π = pq − wL − rK. Labour and capital are paid at their marginal product, ∂qs∂K and ∂qs∂L .
The model is static in the sense that the even in its dynamic versions, output levels and prices are
‘pre-solved’ by the Walrasian auctioneer for all future periods. This is a defining feature of linear
programming methods that removes all noting of determinism or path dependency when used for
comparative statics.
In the short-run competitive model firms expand production until the marginal cost is increasing
and cease expanding production when the supply curve intersects the marginal revenue curve,
which is a horizontal demand curve under price-taking assumptions34. In the market aggregate
the supply curve is the horizontal summation of the individual firm supply curves, and the demand
curve takes on its usual downward slope, despite repeated criticisms of the necessary assumptions
2The defining reference for the neoclassical theory of markets is Mas-Colell et al. (1995)
3Marginal revenue is the derivative of revenue, qP (q), with respect to q.
4Apart from the special cases of natural monopoly.
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required for this aggregation to be valid (Keen & Standish 2012). The scope of these curves as
described by (Mas-Colell et al. 1995) is shown in Figure 2.
While the price-taking assumption could be reasonable for some small scale production in large
markets and other special circumstances, it is unlikely to be generally true in major commodity
markets that are typically dominated by few large firms - agriculture, metals, fossil fuels, super-
markets, vehicles, construction and so forth are just some examples. More realistically firms face
a downward sloping demand curve for their own output, and the Cournot model deals with opti-
mal production decisions in these circumstances. As the number of firms increases, the Cournot
model converges to the perfectly competitive outcome.5 In the neoclassical world, competition is
construed as a failure of firms to coordinate to maximise their joint profit - a failure that becomes
more prevalent as the number of firms in a market increases.
The core model is typically used to analyse output and price responses to exogenous ‘demand
shocks’ or ‘supply shocks’ in the ‘short-run’. Yet under the general equilibrium assumptions in
the model, if a market is not in equilibrium, then no other market can be in equilibrium. If there
exists a source of a demand shock, then by definition all markets are not in equilibrium and the
firm’s cost curves during this ‘demand shock’ need not be fixed, as relative price levels must be
changing. The grand assumption of equilibrium and the potential for demand shocks are merely
additional simplifying assumptions made when analysing partial equilibrium of markets within
this framework.
In the case of a positive demand shock the new profit-maximising level of output is not at all
intuitive for most students learning the model - why increase output and price when you could
simply increase price to a higher level and not adjust output? The story used to persuade first
year economics students is that if the cost of production is below the price, or marginal revenue
in more sophisticated versions, why wouldn’t a firm keep producing to capture that little bit of
extra profit? At first glance the logic can appear sound. Indeed students often respond with how
profound that is, when they naively assumed that firms would cease expanding production when
average total cost was at a minimum.
As will be later shown, the student’s intuition was correct.
In the long run, since capital is no longer assumed to be fixed, all output is produced at the
minimal cost meaning that all firms produce at the minimum average total cost, which is also
the price. How one conceptually deals with the fact that any point is time is always a short-run
and the long-run outcome of previous periods, is never fully considered. Time does not enter the
model in a meaningful way.
2.2 Fundamental welfare theorems
The transition between the positive nature of the neoclassical descriptive model and its normative
interpretations is bridged by the fundamental welfare theorems which are derived in full in Mas-
Colell et al. (1995) and are briefly described as
1. Every Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto-efficient
2. Every Pareto-efficient allocation can be supported as a Walrasian equilibrium
A critical requirement of the second theorem is the convexity of preferences and production sets, or
to be clear, the absence of economics of scale. Moreover, all the other assumptions for competitive
markets are also required, such as perfect information, no externalities, free entry and disposal,
complete markets including perfect credit markets and more. These theorems are the lever allowing
economic analysis to rise from a mere description of markets, to a morally justifiable normative
approach to policy assessment, using the weight of the utilitarian foundations of consumer theory.
5Cournot is just one of a family of models of imperfect competition
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Figure 2: Cost curves and market outcomes for simple model of the firm and market (Mas-Colell et al.
1995)
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Yet if markets operate in ways the conflict with any or all of the assumptions required for these
welfare theorems to hold, the lever is broken and these moral foundations collapse.
2.3 Circular arguments over the source of ‘normal’ returns
Costs in the core neoclassical model include the opportunity cost of alternative investment - a
‘normal’ rate of return, or the ‘risk-free’ rate of return. In the neoclassical world the natural
risk-free rate is a mere reflection of the time-preferences of consumers and producers. These deep
parameters are can potentially be reflected in government policy either as a reaction to markets,
or as a correction to some perceived imperfection of money and credit markets.
One persistent criticism is as follows.
The rate of interest is normally positive for a quite different reason. Present pur-
chasing power is valuable partly because, under the capitalist rules of the game, it
permits its owner . . . to employ labour and undertake production which will yield a
surplus of receipts over costs. In an economy in which the rate of profit is expected to
be positive, the rate of interest is positive . . . [and so] the present value of purchasing
power exceeds its future value to the corresponding extent. . . This is nothing what-
ever to do with the subjective rate of discount of the future of the individual concerned.
. . (Robinson 1952)
If opportunity costs are embedded in costs, yet all markets are in equilibrium reflecting the op-
portunity costs, there is no other source of this normal rate of return.
We have Marshall’s theory that the rate of interest is the “reward of waiting”
but “waiting” only means owning wealth. A man “may have obtained the defacto
possession of property by inheritance or by any other means, moral or immoral, legal or
illegal. But if, having the power to consume that property in immediate gratifications,
he chooses to put it in such a form as to afford him deferred gratifications, then any
superiority there may be in deferred gratifications over those immediate ones is the
reward of his waiting” (1890, pp. 613-14).
In short, a man who refrains from blowing his capital in orgies and feasts can
continue to get interest on it. This seems to be perfectly correct, but as a theory of
distribution it is only a circular argument. (Robinson 1972)
The same circular argument applied to rental returns to real property. The cost of creating land is
zero. Therefore the opportunity cost must be the price at which one could sell the land. But that
price is determined by the market and is merely the rent capitalised at a normal rate of return.
The absence of time in the core model leads to the necessary assumption of some non-market
exogenous source of normal returns.
Indeed, the real problem for this equilibrium notion of ‘normal returns’ is that if a market is
perfectly competitive and no one firm can make returns higher than this rate, where is the incentive
to invest in real productive activities? Why not put your funds in the bank rather than purchase
capital goods, hire a labour force, and produce real products? If real firms do make returns
above the ‘normal rate’ than we have automatically introduced a new dimension to our notion of
competition - competition based on pricing that seeks to maximise this rate of return above the
normal rate, rather than maximise profits taking this rate as given.
3 A market model with return-seeking firms
The premise of this model is that firms do not simultaneously solve their pricing and output
decisions, but react to their environment in ways that can increase their rate of return over the
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long run. Capital is fixed only for the single period for which output level decisions are made,
while capital investment decisions occur across periods, allowing the next period cost curve to
change as a result of capital investment. Costs exclude rents, but include include amortised
capital investment from previous periods, labour and material inputs. Returns are nominal.
The core of the model reflects the routine financial decision-making process of firms whereby
returns are maximised subject to constrains such as competition, demand, and legal and regulatory
conditions. Given the uncertainty surrounding these constraint, the model is described as return-
seeking, since any long term maximum is ultimately unknowable. Equation (1) expresses the
firm’s return-seeking objective of increasing their discounted revenue per dollar of cost over the
foreseeable future, denoted h for the planning horizon.
returns = max
∫ h
0
pt(qt)qt(Kt, Lt, Pt)− (wtLt + ctKt + rtPt)
(wtLt + ctKt + rtPt)
e−ρtdt
⇒ max
∫ h
0
pt(qt)qt(Kt, Lt, Pt)
(wtLt + ctKt + rtPt)
e−ρtdt
(1)
This calculation is equivalent to maximising the internal rate of return for a capital investment
decision. It needs no understanding of marginal cost or marginal revenue to be optimised. Be-
fore proceeding it is worth specifying that maximising returns can analytically determined by
differentiating with respect to q at any point in time resulting in
max returns ⇒ ∂r
∂q
=
p′(q)ATC(q)− p(q)ATC ′(q)
ATC(q)2
= 0. (2)
The output condition for this to be true is when the gradient of the demand curve, time the
average cost curve, is equal to the gradient of the cost curve times the demand curve, or
p′(q)ATC(q) = p(q)ATC ′(q) and ATC(q) 6= 0. (3)
Of course this short-run maximising option need not be an option available to most firms in
competitive markets, and later it will be shown how competition acts as a constraint on returns,
allowing production beyond this point in markets where firms face downward-sloping cost curves.
In light of both real constraints of firm activities, and the uncertainty inherent in the inter-temporal
nature of their investment and output decisions, firm behaviour in this model is described as return-
seeking, rather than return-maximisation. Firms make decisions seeking to improve their returns
over the long run, but may not be able to maximise them in the short run because of the threat
from existing and potential competitors.
Figure 3 shows a selection of cost and demand curves and the difference in optimal output and
price under return-maximising, (QR, PR), and profit-maximising, (QP , PP ), behaviour. Only in
the case where variable/marginal costs are zero do the two models find that same optimising
output level6.
Those familiar with the family of neoclassical market models, including Cournot and Bertrand
competition and other variations of semi-competitive models, might now be asking the question of
how a market optimising solution is found under this proposed new framework. The answer is there
is no hard analytical such solution. Without knowing about inherent risks in a particular market
(the uncertainty over future demand), the limitations to competition from both property markets
(either from access to physical locations, or access to intellectual property), and the economies of
6It should also be noted that the optimal output in a return-maximising situation can occur on the downward
sloping section of the marginal cost curve.
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QP
Firm optimisation with marginal cost equal to zero
PRÈÈPP
QRÈÈQp
Q
P
Firm optimisation facing decreasing demand
PP
PR
QR QP
Demand over period t Av. total cost over period t
Marginal Cost Marginal Revenue
Q
P
Firm optimisation with flat demand curve
QR Qp
Figure 3: Return-maximising and profit maximising output compared
scale from the range of potential production techniques, little can be said about the likely market
price, output level, or number of firms.7
4 Implications of the new model
Reframing the firm’s decision problem leads to many new insights about market allocation and
investment mechanisms, most of which are consistent with the business literature In particular, it
demonstrates that the timing of new capital investment is the critical decision facing firms, with
output decisions a secondary consideration. In fact the driver of output growth under a stable
demand curve is new capital investment which capture economies of scale. Changing technology
enter the model through the new cost function associated with the capital investment based on
this technology.
It reveals that the shape of the supply curve is not reflective of the horizontal summation of firm
cost curves, but of the market power of firms due to an inability for competitive entry into the
market. It shows that even under the assumptions of the neoclassical market allocation model
with fixed capital, the optimal output level for a firm is much lower, meaning that the capital per
unit of output is generally higher than what is expected under the neoclassical models. And it
shows that competing for market share is one of many effective return-seeking activities.
4.1 Capital investment decisions
The short story about capital investment decisions is that if you are a firm that faces diminishing
average total cost (declining unit costs), when these economies of scale are exhausted it signals the
need for new capital investment. There are no circumstances by which returns can be improved
by producing output on the upward sloping section of the average total cost curve, even in the
most extreme case of a firm facing a perfectly horizontal demand curve. The common student
intuition about the importance of the minimum point in the average cost curve is correct.
In a market where any or all firms are operating at this point following an unexpected shift to the
right of the demand curve, returns will be temporarily increased. These high returns will attract
new capital (from existing or new firms) into the market, knowing that they can receive acceptable
returns even once their new output is added to the existing market output.
How high do these returns have to be to attract new capital investment?
7Unlike the neoclassical market models, the exact number of firms in a market under this model is of little
consequence to firm behaviour. It is the threat of alternative sources of production that limit returns
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This depends on two important factors - the shape of the demand curve, and what I call the
‘marginal capital unit output’, which is a measure of the output level that justifies investment in
a new increment of capital at the current price. The technicalities of this increment of capital are
important. In many cases, existing production techniques can be augmented and incrementally
improved. However, at other times a particular location may have exhausted its potential and a
whole new production facility may be required to increase output.
Where incremental capital augmentation is no longer a viable investment option new market
entrants are likely to appear. In the first case, the existing firms have a large advantage in being
able to invest in smaller increments of capital, keeping returns low enough to protect them from
new entrants who would require a very large increment of capital to begin any production.
The marginal capital unit output attracts investment when its cost can be justified by maintaining
the level or return at the new level of output. This condition is represented in Equation (4), where
the p function represents the demand curve as a function of market output q, Cu is the the
marginal capital unit output, c(Cu) is the cost of the marginal capital unit and ct is the total cost
of producing the previous output level prior to the capital investment in Cu. At the expect time
k the new capital investment is justified. In some cases, new production technology may justify a
k of zero as soon as it is viable. In other cases where production technology changes very slowly,
k will mostly depend on the age of current capital.
p(q + Cu)t+k(q + Cu)
ct + c(Cu)t+k
=
p(q)tq
ct
(4)
To be clear, the optimal timing of new investment in a simple case of a market with four firms8
utilising the same capital and production techniques is presented graphically in Figure 4. With
an arbitrary starting point, at time t all firms are producing at their return-seeking level facing
the market demand curve Dt. The next marginal capital unit is only available at the scale of an
existing firm production level. When the demand curve begins to shift, and firms expect this to
be a permanent shift9 that will at least move beyond Dt+k, they will undertake this new capital
investment, allowing output to increase without an increase in price.
While this investment is being undertaken there may be short periods where one or other firm is
operating on an upward sloping portion of their average total cost curve. What will be clear from
this analysis however is that market power is likely to exist in markets where the marginal capital
unit is a large share of the market. In this case, since there are no intermediate steps between
output levels from say one production plant, and two plants, the period of time in which the
demand schedule is such that prices do not justify investment in a second plant, the owner of the
first plant will enjoy a temporary monopoly, despite free entry - due simply to the technicalities
and scale of existing production techniques. Thus, market power is driven more by opportunities
investment in marginal capital units, than the number of firms in an industry.
Of course nothing said here contradict long run neoclassical models, which espouse a flat supply
curve. But without understanding the short-run in the context of these long run decisions, strange
results such as upward sloping costs curves will emerge, greatly reducing the descriptive power of
the model.
4.2 Firms minimise returns when they maximise profits
Section 3 showed that the return-seeking firm produces a lower quantity of output for a given level
of capital investment than predicted by neoclassical market models under all scenarios except
when marginal costs are zero. Figure 5 shows the situation from centre panel of Figure 3, where
8Or a market of 1-3 firms utilising 4 ‘units’ of capital
9A temporary shift in the demand curve leads to alternative decisions discussed in a alter section
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QP
Firm's capital investment timing decision
Qt Qt + k
Pt, Ht + kL
Pmax
Dt
Dt + k
Figure 4: Timing capital investment from a permanent shift in the demand curve
the firm faces a downward sloping demand curve. The optimal output under a profit maximising
assumption, QP , is much higher that output of a return maximising firm, QR.
Q
P
QR QP
Return Economic profit
Firm return and profit
Figure 5: Profit and returns against firm output
The question to consider here is what assumption needs to hold for the profit-maximising output
be financially superior decision to the return-seeking output level. And that assumption is that
the marginal cost of new unit of output is zero over the time period under consideration. Any time
marginal costs are non-zero, the return on these costs must also be factored into firm decisions.
If any firm in a market decided to operate at the profit-maximising level, they would be reducing
their own returns with very little consequence for their competitors.
4.3 Supply curves can be any shape
Blinder’s (1998) detailed research showed that firms typically operate on the downward sloping
part of their average cost curve, and often on the downward sloping part of their marginal cost
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curve. Indeed, 89% of interviewed firms had flat or downward sloping cost curves, despite economic
theory suggesting that this should be a special case of a general rule of supply. By introducing
returns on all costs as the firms goal, we are able to distinguish between the return-optimising
behaviour that can lead to the appearance of an upwards sloping supply curve despite each firm
facing downward sloping supply curves.
As a rule of thumb, the return-seeking model of firms finds that an upward sloping supply curve
can arise in two situations. First, when a temporary monopoly situation arises from unanticipated
short-term demand shock. Second, a market with increasing ‘marginal capital unit’ costs. This
means, for example, that investing in the next unit of capital is more expensive than the last unit.
The common example is in mining and natural resources, where expanding production requires
capital investment in more expensive to extract resources. Both of these situations are described
in this section and compared with markets where firms face decreasing ‘marginal capital unit’
costs and declining average cost curves.
In the first case we have a market with few firms who face little to no short term threat of losing
market share to their competitors - at least within the period of time the demand shift is expected
to last. In Figure 6 an apparent upward sloping supply curve can be derived when firms choose
increase prices, output and returns in response to a known short-term shock, a shock which will
not trigger any new capital investment. Since no firm is likely to lose their market share to another
(a process described in more detail in Section 5), each is able to increase returns over this short
period without risking future returns due to competition from other firms.
Q
P
Short run supply curve in non-competitive market
P
PS
Q QS
Dt
DS
S
Q
P
Short run supply curve in competitive market
PS
P
Q QS
Dt
DS
S
Figure 6: Apparent supply curve from demand shock (non-competitive and competitive short-run)
However, on the right panel of Figure 6 it can be seen that in a highly competitive environment,
where market share could be lost during the period of the demand shock, firms may choose to
maintain their existing level of returns, allowing them to compete on price win market share. The
net result of this behaviour is an increase in output with lower prices during the demand shock.
This type of analysis lead to an alternative interpretation of estimated slope of supply curves in
the short run. Namely, that the less short run competitive exists, the steeper the upward slope of
the short run supply curve. Estimating the shape of the supply curve provides a corresponding
estimate of the competitiveness of the market.
In the second case, of markets with increasing ‘marginal capital unit’ costs, it is best to have in
mind resource markets such as minerals, where new deposits can only be mined at higher cost than
currently mined deposits. Capital is invested in periods prior to when the product is delivered,
although contracts may also be negotiated prior to the capital investment itself. Essentially average
unit costs falls rapidly once the capital is invested, and beyond the optimal capacity there may be
some small scope to use the capital more intensely before new investment in the marginal capital
unit is required.
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QP
Rent
Qt Qt + k
Pt
Pt + k
Figure 7: Supply curve range from demand shift in resource market (and of rents)
Figure 7 shows a descriptive model of such a market. Three units of capital, potentially three mine
sites, possibly three firms, are operating at time t. The mines are at different sites, with unit costs
reflecting the remoteness and richness of deposits. The ordering of the firm cost curves is such
that the most costly mine is the marginal mine. When demand shifts there is a period in which
output cannot be increased noticeable prior to the point when the next unit of capital investment
become viable. Thus, depending on how well this shift is anticipated, the apparent supply curve
will fall somewhere between the two arrows. For example, if the demand shift is anticipated then
miners will contract for future deliveries from the new site (the dashed cost curve) prior to their
investment, and the existing mines will only be able to charge at this new price, Pt+k.
The final important feature of such markets is that they attract economic rents. Those who own
property rights to more advantageous locations - be it mineral deposits, or simply land itself -
will earn rents over time as demand shifts and marginal units of these property rights attract
capital investment. The rent is the revenue above the price that would have attracted the capital
investment, this price being defined as the current returns that attract investment in this market on
capital costs (excluding the cost of the property right itself, since this cost equals the capitalised
value of the rent). By not combining money, capital (the physical produced commodities that
contribute to the production of commodities in future periods), and property rights into a single
fungible concept of capital, the model allows for potential extensions that consider the interaction
of debt creation, physical capital investment, and property rights values.
5 Competition is a process and a constraint
“Innovation and heterogeneity are the true hallmarks of competition, yet these concepts are
effectively excluded by the neoclassical model” - Keen and Standish (2011)
By ignoring time, and invoking the Walrasian auctioneer, the neoclassical model can ironically be
said to model competition by assuming it already happened before any trade took place. For most
analysis of real markets at real points in time this is not a useful assumption to make. Even the
comparative statics that arise from neoclassical models fail to describe the way one equilibrium
could transition to another. For example, Keen and Standish (2010) simulate an almost perfect
market, where firm choice of output arises in response to the change in profit from the previous
period. If increasing output increased profits in the previous period, they will continue to increase
in the next. Without the ability of a central planner to prearrange the output levels of all firms,
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there is no way to generate any signal for firms to stop their behaviour when they reach the Cornout
output level. A signal only arises when the market as a whole is producing at the monopoly level
of output.
Problems of competition are typically framed by neoclassical economists as problems of coordina-
tion of output levels given fixed capital costs. A market with many firms will be unable to collude,
and therefore they will increase output at the expense of others, and the group as a whole. Com-
petitive markets will give up producer surpluses to consumers, and increase total surplus in the
process.
Apart from the notion of producer surplus being ill-conceived10, competition is not a static decision
to increase output over a brief period of time. Competition is a process of maximising returns on
costs by the entrepreneur that are generated by their innovative and coordinative efforts.
Equation (1) is a useful guide to this process, recalling that h is the planning horizon of a firm,
c is the cost of capital and material inputs at time t, r is the rent for real property, and w is the
wage cost of labour.
returns = max
∫ h
0
pt(qt)qt(Kt, Lt, Pt)
(wtLt + ctKt + rtPt)
e−ρtdt
Each variable in this equation provides a clue as to how firms can pursue their return-seeking
objectives. These include (but are not limited to):
1. via a reduction in input quantities per unit of output, be it labour, L, or capital equipment
K through new production techniques and updated capital equipment,
2. via a reduction in unit costs, be it labour costs, w, or the cost of capital equipment c,
3. via product differentiation, which generates a steeper firm demand curve due to less substi-
tutability,
4. via increasing market share and the pursuit of customer loyalty to shift the firm demand
curve (both higher and steeper),
5. via pricing strategies that reduce the attractiveness of your market to potential competitors
(preserving p and q over future time periods),
6. via regulatory capture and regulation to increase the demand curve and steepen its slope, or
7. via mergers, which increase market share and reduce unit costs.
These actions and more define the process that is competition, and are typical of firm behaviours in
real markets. Some are features of the economics textbooks, while others rarely feature in economic
analysis, but are commonly described in business schools. For example, increasing market share
in a competitive market of where firms face increasing marginal costs reduces profits. So why is
it such a common competitive strategy?
One critical item on the above list is the use of pricing strategies. As noted earlier, the return-
maximising price and output level for a firm may be possible in the short-run, during periods of
unanticipated demand. However, if this short-run return is likely to create future costs from loss
of market share, an alternative pricing strategy that results in lower short-run returns will instead
be pursued. Remember the model maximises returns over the foreseeable planning horizon rather
than a single period. Thus the threat of new entrants into the market, or the threat of losing
market share to existing competitors, is the key constraint on prices that competition provides.
Competition strategies that arise from the model can be clustered into three main areas - pricing,
reducing unit costs and augmenting the firm demand curve.
10Producers are rewarded by a real return on their costs
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5.1 Competition through pricing
Probably the most direct element of firm competition the is pricing. In the neoclassical market
models, prices are set only as an allocation mechanism that clears markets in the short-run.
However, in the return-seeking model, prices are set to in regards to dynamic considerations
such as future capital investment, changing market share, and defending the market from new
competitors.
The last item is crucial. Even when the number of firms in a market is low, if the marginal unit of
capital is small relative to the market, and technology changes mean new capital can reduce costs,
firms will have an incentive to price in a way that their returns will not attract competitors to
invest in the marginal capital unit before they do. Mark-up pricing, for example, is a rule of thumb
that firms can use to ensure their returns are broadly consistent with their current competitors.
Thus, pricing strategy depends on the size of the marginal unit of capital relative to the market
demand, and the technical and legal abilities of competitors or new entrants to invest. In terms
of Equation (1) pricing strategies aim to preserve revenue in the over the planning horizon.
The wide existence of this strategy provides the possibility that duopolies can still appear very
competitive, and have reasonably low and stable returns, even though traditional Cournot theory
would say that they restrict output and generate ‘abnormal returns’. This can occur even with
high sunk costs, which is not the usual case in contestable market theory. Where duopolies and
oligopolies may be able to increase returns is through erecting legal, contractual and regulatory
barriers for potential new competitors.
The opposite of defensive pricing would be understood as price gouging. When a business has a
monopoly and the ability to change prices regularly, it will exploit seasonal shifts in the demand
curve. For example, petrol retailing is a local monopoly facing a weekly demand cycle. As such,
the rational pricing behaviour is to change prices daily to maximise returns. When retailers have
less local monopoly power, these price fluctuations are lower11
To reiterate an earlier point, the message here is that price increases in response to demand changes
are hallmarks of markets with low levels of competition and high levels of firm pricing power.
5.2 Competition through unit cost reduction
5.2.1 Capital investment
Consider a firm in a competitive market. Each firm faces a particular cost profile based on the
vintage of their capital. The firm that invests in new technology capital first enables them to
capture higher returns for a period until other firms invest in similar, or improved capital. The
optimal point of investment in new capital obviously depends on the age, cost, depreciated value
and productivity of current capital, compared to new capital.
This process occurs in all markets where existing or new competitors are a threat. The process of
new competitors entering the market decreases prices because it expands the productive base and
reduces the market-wide average total cost curve. While Baumol et al. (1982) provide the basis
for mainstream theories of contestable markets, there is little reason to require the fundamental
assumptions of Baumol’s theories, such as no entry barriers, no sunk costs, and access to the same
technology. Existing and new firms can compete, based on new technology capital and in the face
of sunk costs, if returns are high enough to attract them.
Take the example market in Figure 8. The three grey cost curves, included the dashed curve, show
three firms using capital of different vintage, with prices are set by each firm such that returns are
11See Hogg et al. 2012 for spatial and temporal analysis of petrol retail pricing.
http://www.ncer.edu.au/papers/documents/WP86.pdf
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satisfactory for all capital to be utilised (price P ). However these returns are also high enough to
attract a new competitor with access to new technology capital. The black dashed curve is the
cost curve of the new competitor. If they invest in capital and enter the market, the new price of
this good when the new supply is added will be PC .
Q
P
New technology marginal capital unit entering as competitive market
P
PC
Q QC
D
Figure 8: Market supply and firm output with new competitor
However, since the new price is below the cost of the highest cost incumbent firm, that firm (or
that part of a larger firm with multiple capital units) will retire their capital until they can invest in
the low cost technology capital being utilised by the new entrant. When the incumbent leaves the
market the new output is determined by the three lower cost firms. Figure 9 shows this outcome,
and that each remaining firm improves their return by increasing their output. Whether the
change in output and price stops at this point depends on the competitive dynamics involved. If
the displaced incumbent was a single firm, it might be viable for these remaining firms to increase
production beyond this point, accepting temporarily lower returns, in order to defend agains the
displaced firm reinvesting in the market.
Q
P
After incumbent leaves the market
P
PC
Q QC
D
Figure 9: Market supply, optimal firm output, and new competitor with incumbent displaced
We expect therefore, that a period where new product and production techniques are being imple-
mented, a competitive environment will emerge as firms seek to capture high returns from being
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the first to invest in new capital and methods of production. Indeed, if economies of scale are
present we would expect the number of firms surviving this period of competition to relatively
low, which then shields them from Baumol-type short term competitive threats.
It is no surprise that one of the core competitive actions in a capitalist economy is to invest in
better capital.
How exactly do these investments transmit through the return function? New capital typically
allows reduced labour input L, per unit of output, which comes at a price cheaper that the increase
in capital cost cK. Thus the term wL + cK is reduced, and returns increased.
5.3 Wage costs
The timeless political battle between wages and profits must have its ultimate source in markets
or the policy framework that supports private market production. By the definition in Equation
(1) a reduction in w always results in an increase in returns, and if it occurs across the whole
economy more broadly, results in an increase in rents.
The simply way to envisage this mechanism is to think of a shopping centre owner. Retail rents
are determined by the willingness to pay by the marginal shop tenant, who determines this by
subtracting costs and their hurdle rate of return from their expected revenue. This rate of return
is usually quite market specific. If just one tenant in the shopping manages to reduce wage costs
they simply increase their own returns. It is highly unlikely that they will be the marginal rent
setter for the centre as a whole. Yet if every shop tenant benefits from the same reduction in wages
costs, through a policy change or some kind of fundamental reorganisation of retail businesses in
general, then the shopping centre owner can now capture these reduced wages as rents by holding
out for a rent price where the marginal tenant will still meet their hurdle rate of return.
How this trade-off aggregates at a macro-level is unclear. For example, wages determine household
incomes, which determine the price able to be paid for housing. If wages are falling, owners of
residential land face falling rents, even if owners of non-residential land and other assets face
increases in rents. Thus, the competition between rent-seeking owners of real property can result
in a reasonable bargaining position for wage earners, being supported by those whose rents directly
rely on wage levels.
Additionally, reduction in general business costs, typically referred to as ‘red tape’, is a common
tactic of rentiers. In the same vein as reducing economy-wide wages, reducing c will simply produce
higher rents. The outcomes of the policy and technology changes are very much conditional on
the patterns of ownership of real property and commercial business. One fundamentally requires
a market theory that supports disaggregation of rents and returns to properly analyse the output
and distributional effects of wage-related policy and technology.
5.4 Competition through demand augmentation
5.5 Product differentiation
Firms can increase returns is to be the first to innovate and bring a new product to market.
Creating a new market niche allows firms to face a much higher and steeper firm demand curve,
as products are less substitutable and competition is yet to take place in that new market. The
first mover advantage in new markets is a clear driver of competition.
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5.6 Marketing and customer loyalty
Manipulating the shape of the firm demand curve can be a beneficial a return-seeking strategy.
Marketing attaches an emotional signal to a product that is hard for customers to replace, making
the product of now firm less substitutable with another. In the return-seeking model a steeper
demand curve increases returns.
A complementary method for creating less price sensitive customers is through the promotion of
firm, or brand, loyalty. Through loyalty rewards schemes, or simply through the trust generated
by returns policies, warranties and other initiatives, loyalty can be a tool for firms for create less
price sensitive customers and increase returns.
5.7 Market share
If cost curves are downward sloping it makes sense to capture market share from competitors to
increase returns that arise from gaining the largest economies of scale, and decrease the returns
of competitors who will be unable to harness as significant economies of scale. Attracting market
share from competitors is usually the goal, rather than a method of competition, but it needs to
be stated here why this strategy is consistent with the return-seeking model.
Simply put, market share means the share of total market output a firm can produce while
maintaining the price level. For a firm facing a downward sloping cost curve and few new capital
investment opportunities, increasing market share is one of the few options to increase returns by
facilitating lower unit costs of production.
An alternative method of gaining market share is through mergers. Mergers are generally attractive
in markets where production occurs with increasing returns to scale, allowing the merged entity
to lower their cost curve. The difference between the neoclassical models of restricted competition
and the return-seeking model reveals that threat of merger to competition is dependent on the
cost profile and size of the marginal capital unit.
5.8 Lobbying for regulatory change
Since all markets operate within a legal and regulatory framework, the ability of changes to the
rules of the game to shift the curves facing individual firms or industries is a particular avenue for
increasing returns of a particular firm. This motive is well developed by public choice economists,
although integrating this idea into the neoclassical market model is conceptually difficult. In the
return-seeking model we can interpret policy changes as having price impacts through the potential
removal for future competitors, which were being considered in the pricing decision of firms.
We can imagine that firms may wish to increase ‘red-tape’ to defend their market from new
entrants, especially if their are economies of scale to the administrative burden. A firm may find
that a new law would cost them 0.1% of the price per unit of output at their current level of
production, but for a new firm produce just a tenth of their output, the administrative cost might
be 2% of the price.
6 Normal returns and welfare considerations
Two concepts need to be cleared up before concluding overview. First is that the only rates of
return considered here are nominal, not real. Only nominal variables are observed in the market
place, along with expectations of the growth in these variables over the planning horizon. Rates
of return are therefore emergent from subjective risk-weightings of firms in any particular market.
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Second, the welfare theorems that support the normative position of economic theory have no
basis. The very concept of surpluses fails to enter any calculation. All that exist are returns,
rents and consumption, distributed in various ways between individuals and organisations in the
economy. Those seeking a measure of ‘success’ need to choose their own moral foundations.
7 Final remarks
The neoclassical market model forms the core of the economics discipline. However when seeking
to understand real markets economists are forced to drop many of the basic features of the core
model. A model of return-seeking firms is consistent with empirical evidence on the shape of
demand curves, the true costs structure faced by firms, and is suggestive of the mechanisms by
which the process of competition operates. A key ingredient is the inclusion of economic rents,
and the revelation of the trade-offs between production costs and rents, taxes, wages and the costs
of regulation.
The model also preempts some critical concepts that may be relevant for improving our knowledge
of the economy. For instance, return-seeking firms are likely to be attracted to debt in order to
leverage their return. Competitive pressures may generate an appetite for debt amongst firms
that permeates through the competitive pressures of markets - if one firm leverages their returns,
others must follow. Such a cascading nature of debt/credit issuance could generate business cycles
with ‘micro-foundations’ consistent with this model.
Identifying the nature of rents in the model leads opens new avenues of analysis of capital in-
vestment. Particularly, we can identity that lowering rents will increase returns from capital
investment, which opens up new scope for policy to both incentivise capital investment in general,
and to respond to recessionary conditions. For example, when a new location is required for a
manufacturing plant, existing land owners may not sell at a price that makes the new invest-
ment attractive, withholding their land from development consistently with their own long-run
return-seeking strategy.
An important element that has been presently overlooked for the purpose of introducing the model
is whether there are any normative interpretations to be made in a similar vein to the fundamental
welfare theorems. Is the proper measure of welfare simply total macroeconomic output, adjusted
for legitimate notions of social equity?
It needs to be noted that this model of a market with return-seeking firms is intended to be
a trigger for a large scale departure from neoclassical market theories. Marginalist approaches
are not required to understand markets, nor does equating marginal revenue with marginal cost
maximise returns for a firm even in the short-run Moreover, this departure means that wages and
rents are not primarily determined by markets, but are in fact social decisions, or institutional
constructs, that emerge from the legal and political environment to which markets respond.
I will conclude by preempting reactions to this exposition from the economics profession. Reactions
will fall into discrete categories. First, there will be those who roughly agree with most of what I
have written and will say that there is nothing new in here; that there are economic models that
allow for positive profits and natural monopolies which handle the cases described above. To them
I say please consider the value of a core model that requires such extensive ad hoc modification
to be consistent with empirical regularities, and still fails to be predictive.
The second category will be those who think I have misrepresented the neoclassical market mod-
els. That I am criticising only what is covered in introductory economics courses and not the
more sophisticated modern research. To them I say that I have in fact based the description of
neoclassical models on the most popular post-graduate micro-economics textbook, since it is far
more honest about its assumptions than any undergraduate text. Further, that even the most
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modern models are typically variations of the same core, pre-solved and ignorant of any method
for reaching their solutions.
The final category is those who believe I have left out something of crucial importance in this
short exposition. I admit that in all likelihood I have. I cannot perfectly rewrite the core model
of a whole discipline. The idea is to introduce a framework, a scaffolding, to bridge the gap
between economic analysis of markets and the actual self-reported behaviour of firms. When
the truly fundamental feature of the model, the process of firms seeking returns over profits,
cascades through a consistent aggregation method into market, the interactions will be dependent
on additional assumptions, most of which I hope are drawn from observations, such as legal
constraints and limits to knowledge.
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